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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Cody William Parmer appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of battery with the intent to commit rape.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Coeur d'Alene police officer Greg Moore responded to the Kootenai
Medical Center in response to a report of a sexual assault. (Tr.1, p.7, Ls.10-15.)
There, 17-year-old S.H. reported to Moore and the attending physician that she
had been raped by Cody Parmer. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-23; p.368, Ls.7-15.)
S.H. was at Parmer's residence the previous evening. (Tr., p.222, L.7 p.223, L.17; p.580, L.13 - p.581, L.6.) There, S.H., Parmer, Parmer's roommate
Amanda Seeling, and another individual drank alcohol, danced, and played
cards. (Tr., p.224, L.12 - p.225, L.9; p.229, L.13 - p.232, L.6.) While S.H. and
Parmer were dancing, Parmer bit S.H.'s neck several times and tried to put his
hands down her pants. (Tr., p.232, L.7 - p.233, L.11.) Later, S.H. wasn't feeling
well and went to lay down on Seeling's bed, where she was soon joined by
Parmer and Seeling. (Tr., p.233, L.12 - p.235, L.3.) When Seeling momentarily
left the bed, Parmer rolled over on top of S.H., pulled down S.H.'s pants, and
penetrated S.H.'s vagina with his penis. (Tr., p.236, Ls.12-23.) S.H. told Parmer
to stop, and tried to push him off of her, but Parmer bit S.H. several times to
overcome her resistance. (Tr., p.238, L.8 - p.240, L.21.)

In its Respondent's brief, the state cites only to the transcript that contains the
jury trial and sentencing hearing. The state refers to this transcript as "Tr."
1
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S.H. finally got Parmer off of her, and fled the residence in her bare feet.
(Tr., p.240, L.22 - p.241, L.4.)

S.H. contacted several friends and eventually

went to the Kootenai Medical Center. (Tr., p.241, Ls.5-24.) There, S.H. reported
the incident, and medical personnel collected samples for a sexual assault kit.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.14-23; p.368, Ls.7-15; p.383, Ls.13-21.)
Officers interviewed Parmer at his residence, and then at the police
station.

(Tr., p.9, L.4 - p.18, L.6; State's Exhibits 3A, 4A, 4A2.) After initially

denying having any sexual contact with S.H., Parmer eventually admitted to
biting S.H., touching her vagina with his hand, and penetrating her vagina with
his penis. (State's Exhibits 3A, 4A, 4A2, 4B.) At the conclusion of the interview,
an officer took DNA samples from Parmer. (State's Exhibits 4A, 4A2.)
A forensic scientist from the Idaho State Forensic Services Laboratory
found one sperm cell head on one of the vaginal swabs taken from S.H. (Tr.,
p.437, L.5 - p.438, L.6.) The sample was insufficient to support DNA testing.
(Tr., p.444, Ls.16-22.) Swabs taken from bite marks on S.H. revealed a mixed
DNA profile to which Parmer could not be excluded as a contributor. (Tr., p.439,
L.8 - p.443, L.22.)
The state charged Parmer with rape and battery with the intent to commit
rape.

(R., pp.60-62.)

At trial, the district court instructed the jury on the

alternative theories of statutory (I.C. § 18-6101 (1 )) and forcible (I.C. § 18-

2

6101 (3)) rape. 2 (R., pp.226-228.) The court also instructed the jury on battery
with the intent to commit rape and simple battery as alternative lesser included
offenses of rape.

(R., pp.229-235.)

The jury acquitted Parmer of rape, but

convicted him of the lesser included offense of battery with the intent to commit
rape. (R., pp.249-250).

The district court imposed a unified 16-year sentence

with six years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.302-304.) At the conclusion
of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Parmer's
sentence and placed him on probation for five years.
Suspending

Execution

of

Judgment

and

Sentence

(2/16/12 "Order

Following

Retained

Jurisdiction.")3 Parmer timely appealed. (8/26/11 Notice of Appeal.)

2

At the time of the incident underlying Parmer's arrest, statutory rape was
codified as I.C. § 18-6101 (1 ), and constituted sexual intercourse "[w]here the
female is under the age of eighteen (18) years." Forcible rape was codified as
I.C. § 18-6101(3). The legislature subsequently amended I.C. § 18-6101 to
include two categories of statutory rape: I.C. § 18-6101(1) (where the female is
under the age of 16 and the perpetrator is 18 years of age or older), and I.C. §
18-6101 (2) (where the female is 16 or 17 years old and the perpetrator is three or
more years older than the female). The legislature re-codified forcible rape as
I.C. § 18-6101 (4). Idaho Session Laws 2010, ch. 352, § 1, p.1.
3

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Parmer's motion to augment the record with
the district court's "Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence
Following Retained Jurisdiction." (1/2/13 Order.)

3

ISSUES
Parmer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor engage in a pattern of misconduct in
cross-examination that requires reversal in this case?
(Appellant's brief, p.12.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Parmer failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct?

4

ARGUMENT
Parmer Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct

A

Introduction
Parmer contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his

cross-examination of defense witness Amanda Seeling. (Appellant's brief, pp.1321.) Specifically, Parmer contends that upon receiving adverse rulings from the
district court as to the propriety his questions, the prosecutor would "deliberately
repeat the same offending question before the jury."

(Appellant's brief, p.13.)

Parmer contends that through this conduct, the prosecutor sought to present
inadmissible evidence and to inflame the passions and prejudice of the jurors.
(Id.)
However, while Parmer objected to prosecutor's cross-examination
questions he now challenges on appeal, he did not move for a mistrial after the
district court sustained these objections. Parmer has thus already obtained the
only relief that he actually sought during the trial.

His appellate claims of

prosecutorial misconduct are thus subject to fundamental error review.
Parmer has failed to establish such fundamental error. A review of the
prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling reveals that while the prosecutor did
rephrase several questions in response to sustained objections, he did not
persist in questioning Seeling about any inadmissible subject matter, nor did his
questions exhibit any intent to improperly influence th.e jury.

Further, even if

some of the prosecutor's questions were improper, Parmer has failed to establish
prejudice to warrant vacating his conviction.
5

B.

Standard Of Review
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court

exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel.
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted).

A defendant who claims the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct has the burden of proving such.

State v.

Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59,253 P.3d 727, 733 (2011) (citing State v. Perry. 150
Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010)).

C.

Parmer Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His
Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
Appeals to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through the use

of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87,

156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized
"[t]he right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but
a fair one," and the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor
for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the

prosecutor "so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process." State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127
P.3d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005).
"Idaho has limited appellate review of unobjected-to error to cases
wherein the defendant has alleged the violation of a constitutionally protected
6

right." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To obtain appellate review and
reversal on an issue not preserved through timely objection an appellant must
demonstrate: (1) violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is
clear and obvious without the need to further develop the evidence regarding the
error or whether the lack of objection was a tactical decision; and (3) that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.
In this case, though

kl

Parmer objected to the prosecutor's cross-

examination questions at issue, he did not move for a mistrial after the district
court sustained these objections.

Parmer has thus already obtained the only

relief that he actually sought during the trial. The district court did not have the
opportunity to determine whether any improper questioning violated Parmer's
due process rights, or warranted additional relief beyond the sustaining of
Parmer's objections.

Instead, Parmer raises these issues for the first time on

appeal, and is thus subject to fundamental error analysis of these claims.

1.

Parmer Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Violated His Due
Process Rights

Parmer has failed to satisfy the first prong of Perry because he has failed
to show that his constitutional due process rights were violated. In this case, the
prosecutor cross-examined

defense witness Amanda

Seeling

about

her

observations on the night of the incident. (Tr., p.598, L.6 -p.634, L.22; p.636,
L.23 - p.642, L.2.) Prior to trial, Seeling had participated in an interview with the
prosecutor and a state investigator.

(See Tr., p.605, Ls.15-20.)

On several

occasions during the state's cross-examination of Seeling, the prosecutor
7

referred to this prior interview and directed Seeling to review portions of a
corresponding transcript, at times to attempt to refresh her recollection, and at
others to impeach her. (Tr., p.605, L.12 - p.638, L.24.) Defense counsel made
several objections on various grounds during this questioning, some of which
were sustained. (Id.)
Relevant to this appeal, defense counsel first objected to the prosecutor's
line of inquiry regarding whether S.H. appeared scared when Parmer was on top
of her in Seeling's bed. (Tr., p.610, L.6 - p.612, L.12.) At trial, Seeling testified
that she didn't look at S.H.'s face while Parmer was on top of her, and thus could
not tell whether S.H. appeared to be afraid.

(Tr., p.610, Ls.6-17.)

The

prosecutor presented Seeling with the transcript of her prior interview in which
See ling indicated that S. H. did, in fact, appear scared when Parmer was on top
of her. (Tr., p. 61 0, L. 18 - p. 611 , L. 14.)
After Seeling acknowledged her previous statement, the prosecutor
asked, "So you were lying to myself and [the investigator]?" (Tr., p.611, Ls.1117.) The court sustained Parmer's subsequent objection that the question was
argumentative. (Tr., p.611, Ls.15-19.) The prosecutor rephrased the question to
ask, "You were not telling the correct version of what happened when you spoke
with [the investigator] and myself?"

(Tr., p.611, Ls.21-23.)

Parmer objected

again, and the court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.611, L.25 - p.612, L.2.) The
prosecutor rephrased the question once more to ask, "Which version is the
correct one?" (Tr., p.612, L.4.) Parmer did not object to this final phrasing of the

8

question, and Seeling responded that she couldn't remember, due to the level of
her intoxication the night of the incident. (Tr., p.612, Ls.4-12.)
On appeal, Parmer contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
continuing this pattern of questioning regarding Seeling's prior statements
despite the court's adverse evidentiary rulings.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-21.)

Parmer further contends that the prosecutor's "insinuations that Ms. Seeling was
lying were calculated to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury."
(Appellant's brief, p.17.) Parmer's challenge fails for several reasons.
First, despite Parmer's attempts to characterize the prosecutor's crossexamination of Seeling as containing repeated forages into impermissible subject
matter, it was not the substance of the information the prosecutor attempted to
elicit that was the subject of Parmer's trial objections at issue.

Instead, these

objections were raised on the grounds that the nature of the questions
themselves were argumentative.

Contrary to Parmer's assertion (Appellant's

brief, pp.15-16), a sustained objection on the ground that a question is
argumentative does not necessarily require a prosecutor to entirely abandon the
substance of the line of questioning.

Upon the district court's rulings that a

question was argumentative, the prosecutor attempted to appropriately re-phrase
the question.
Further, the prosecutor's numerous references to Seeling's prior interview
statements did not, as Parmer contends, constitute "identical questions," but
instead covered a variety of topics related to Seeling's observations of the
incident.

Indeed, while Parmer appears to suggest that the district court's
9

sustaining of his first objection on the ground that the prosecutor's question was
argumentative prohibited Parmer from challenging Seeling's testimony with her
prior statements in any other context, the district court's evidentiary rulings did
not so restrict the prosecutor.
In addition, a review of the context of the additional portions of the crossexamination challenged by Parmer on appeal reveals that while the prosecutor's
exchanges with Seeling were at times somewhat contentious, and did result in
several sustained defense objections, they did not constitute an improper appeal
to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury, or rise to the level of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Some time after cross-examining Seeling on whether she observed S.H.
to be afraid when Parmer was on top of her, the prosecutor questioned Seeling
about her testimony on direct examination that there had been sexual contact
between herself and S.H. the night of the incident. (Tr., p.625, L.7 - p.628, L.4.)
The prosecutor asked Seeling why she did not share this information with the
police officer who had interviewed her. (Tr., p.625, Ls.7-14.) Seeling responded
that the police officer "wasn't asking about me." (Tr., p.625, Ls.14-15.)

The

prosecutor then asked, "You didn't tell him because [the sexual contact between
Seeling and S.H.] didn't happen. Isn't that right?" (Tr., p.625, Ls.19-20.) The
district court sustained Parmer's objection that this question was argumentative.
(Tr., p.625, Ls.19-23.)
The prosecutor then switched gears and asked Seeling whether she had
ever told anyone else that there was no sexual contact between herself and S.H.
10

(Tr.,. p.625, L.25 -

p.626, L.6.)

Seeling acknowledged that she told the

prosecutor and the state's investigator that no such contact took place, thus
admitting that her trial testimony was contrary to her prior statements.

(Tr.,

p.626, Ls.7-8.) When the prosecutor then asked, "Why would you lie to myself
and [the investigator]?," the district court sustained Parmer's objection on the
ground that the question was argumentative, and specifically ordered the
prosecutor to rephrase the question. (Tr., p.626, Ls.12-20.) The prosecutor did
so, and continued on this line of inquiry for several more questions, without
further sustained objection. (Tr., p.626, L.22 - p.628, L.4.)
The apparent contradiction between Seeling's trial testimony and her prior
statements to the prosecutor and the state investigator was an entirely
appropriate topic for cross-examination.

While the prosecutor re-phrased two

questions in response to sustained defense objections, he did not attempt to elicit
inadmissible testimony or otherwise engage in questioning that rose to the level
of prosecutorial misconduct.
Later, the prosecutor cross-examined Seeling on her testimony on redirect that, to the best she could recall from the evening of the incident, she did
not observe anything that indicated that Parmer "forced himself" on S.H.
p.636, L.17 - p.641, L.23.)

(Tr.,

Specifically, the prosecutor inquired as to how

Seeling could have such an opinion in light of evidence and Seeling's prior
statements that suggested that at the time of the incident: S. H. asked See ling for
help; S.H. told Seeling that she was afraid; Seeling pushed Parmer off of S.H.
when he was on top of her in bed; and that Parmer had bitten S.H., leaving
11

marks on her body.

(Id.)

The prosecutor asked, "This opinion that [defense

counsel] asked you about and that you gave us, you're giving us that opinion
after looking at those bite marks on that girl's body?" (Tr., p.638, Ls.7-10.) The
district court sustained Parmer's objection on the ground that this question was
argumentative. (Tr., p.638, Ls.11-13.) The prosecutor rephrased the question
and asked, "Well, how can you think that his advances were not unwanted when
you look at those bite marks?" (Tr., p.638, Ls.15-17.) Parmer objected again on
the ground that the question was argumentative, and the district court sustained
the objection.

(Tr., p.638, Ls.18-24.)

Upon this second objection, however,

rather than invite the prosecutor to rephrase the question, the court precluded
further questioning on this topic, stating that the prosecutor's question went
beyond calling merely for Seeling's opinion as to S.H.'s consent to any sexual
content, and instead referred to "what was [actually] going on at the time." (Tr.,
p.638, Ls.20-25.) The prosecutor asked Seeling no further questions about the
bite marks on S.H.
The basis of Seeling's testimony on re-direct examination that she did not
observe anything that indicated that Parmer "forced himself' on S.H. was an
entirely appropriate topic for cross-examination.

While the prosecutor again

rephrased several questions in response to sustained defense objections, he did
not attempt to elicit inadmissible testimony or otherwise engage in questioning
that rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
In the final challenged portion of the prosecutor's cross-examination of
Seeling, after Seeling testified that she observed S.H.'s pants around her ankles
12

while Parmer was on top of her, the prosecutor asked her how S.H.'s pants got
there. (Tr., p.614, Ls.20-24.) Seeling responded that she did not know because
she was smoking at the time. (Tr., p.614, L.25 - p.615, L.1.) The prosecutor
then asked, "Didn't he rip them down there?," and Seeling responded that she
didn't know. (Tr., p.615, Ls.2-3.) At that point, the prosecutor directed Seeling to
a transcript of her prior interview, but Seeling asserted that she didn't remember
whether or not Parmer had put S.H.'s pants around her ankles. (Tr., p.615, Ls.415.) Then the prosecutor asked a slightly different question, whether Seeling had
told anyone that she thought Parmer had taken S.H's pants off of her.

(Tr.,

p.615, Ls.16-17.) The district court sustained Parmer's objection to this question
on the grounds of "lack of foundation, personal knowledge." (Tr., p.615, Ls.1620.) The prosecutor then repeated his earlier question, "And he ripped those
down to her ankles?" and the district court sustained Parmer's objection that the
question had been asked and answered. (Tr., p.615, Ls.22-25.)
While the prosecutor's final question was appropriately stricken by the
district court for its repetition, the prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling on
this topic was hardly so egregious as to rise to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct. Seeling's observations and prior statements regarding whether she
saw, or thought, that Parmer pulled S.H.'s pants down was certainly a proper
topic for cross-examination. Once again, the prosecutor did not elicit or attempt
to elicit any inadmissible evidence. The objectionable nature of the prosecutor's
questions was again rooted with the questions themselves. Immediately after the
district made its first and only "asked and answered" evidentiary ruling with
13

regard to this topic, the prosecutor immediately moved on to another topic. (Tr.,
p.615, L.23 - p.616, L.4.)
Parmer has failed to establish that the prosecutor committed misconduct.
The purpose of cross examination is to weaken the testimony of the party
examined. State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 655, 691 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct. App.
1994).

This was the intent of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling.

While the district court had the discretion, pursuant to I.R.E. 611 (a), to exercise
control over and to manage this cross-examination, and specifically to require the
prosecutor to rephrase some of his questions, and to order him to cease
questioning entirely on certain topics, the court's use of this discretion did not
expose any prosecutorial misconduct in this case.

The prosecutor did not

attempt to elicit inadmissible testimony, to defy any evidentiary rulings, or to
improperly inflame the passions of the jury.

Instead, the prosecutor simply

subjected Seeling to spirited cross-examination on several of the topics raised in
her direct examination.

This did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.

Parmer has therefore failed to satisfy the first prong of the Perry fundamental
error test.

2.

Parmer Has Failed To Show That Any Error Was Harmless

The third and final prong of the Perry fundamental error test requires
Parmer to "demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning
(in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial

14

proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Parmer has failed to
make such a showing.
Any impact on the jury of the challenged cross-examination questions
was limited because each of these questions resulted in a sustained objection.
See

19.:.

at 228-229, 245 P.3d at 980-981 (holding that where defense counsel

objected to a question and the district court sustained the objection, harm was
avoided). In this case, it is unclear what specific improper harm the prosecutor's
challenged questions alone may have caused.

On appeal, Parmer has not

hypothesized how the prosecutor's questions may have prejudiced him, except to
broadly label their "inflammatory language seemingly calculated to arouse
negative emotions." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) The challenged questions did not
elicit or reveal inadmissible evidence, reference any inadmissible or damaging
information about Parmer, or directly or indirectly implore the jurors find its verdict
on some improper basis.

Instead, Parmer's objections to the questions were

based primarily on their phrasing and timing.
Further, a review of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Seeling reveals
that Seeling's testimony was likely not even particularly helpful to Parmer's
defense. Seeling acknowledged that she was heavily intoxicated the night of the
incident, which, as she explained numerous times over the course of her
testimony, impacted her memory of the events. (Tr., p.602, L.4 - p.603, L.18;
p.607, L.15 - p.608, L.5; p.612, Ls.13-18; p.616, L.21 - p.617, L.6; p.618, L.4 p.619, L.6.)

Much of what Seeling could remember was not particularly

supportive of Parmer's defense theory, presented at closing argument (Tr.,
15

p.677, L.18 - p.680, L.25), that Parmer did not penetrate Seeling's vagina with
his penis. Seeling testified that she observed that S.H.'s pants were around her
ankles, and that she saw Parmer's bare buttocks "going back and forth," when he
was on top of her.

(Tr., p.612, L.22 - p.613, L.10.)

Further, Seeling did not

present any affirmative testimony which significantly bolstered Parmer's defense.
Even if the prosecutor's objected-to questions somehow improperly impacted the
jury's view of Seeling's credibility, Parmer cannot show that his rights were
prejudiced by any such impact.
Even if Parmer had established prosecutorial misconduct in his case, any
such error did not prejudice his right to a fair trial. Parmer has therefore failed to
establish that any such misconduct warrants vacating his conviction, and has
thus failed to satisfy the third prong of the Perry fundamental error test.

D.

Parmer Has Failed To Establish Cumulative Error
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there

is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless,
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention
of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho
576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted).
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.
1998).

In addition, cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither

objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982
16

Parmer has failed to show any error, much less two or more objected-to
errors. Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See,
~ . LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Parmer guilty of battery with the
intent to commit rape.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2013.
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